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THE  DEPTH of the current  recession  makes  it clear  ex post that  government 
stabilization  policy  should  have been less contractionary  in 1974.  In fact, 
both monetary  and fiscal policy were extremely  contractionary  not only 
relative  to the needs of a declining  economy  but also relative  to policy 
during  the 1972-73  boom. During 1974,  the full employment  budget  sur- 
plus rose sharply  and monetary  expansion  slowed  markedly.  My task in 
this report  is to analyze  the monetary  part  of recent  stabilization  policies. 
A sharp  deceleration  of money  growth  (both  M1  and  M2)  since  mid-1974 
is evident  in figure 1.1  Economists  generally  agree  that money growth  in 
the second  half of 1974 was too low, but split over the proposition  that 
money  growth  in the first  half-6.2  percent  for M1  from  December  1973  to 
June  1974-was about  right.2  As I argued  a year  ago, an M1  growth  target 
of about  6 percent  was  appropriate  on the basis  of information  available  in 
early  and  mid-1974.3  Therefore,  I applaud  the Federal  Reserve  for  restrain- 
Note: I want to thank the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston for research  support  and 
especially  Ruth Kupfer  and Redenta de Leon of the Bank for research  assistance  and 
typing.  The  views  expressed,  however,  are  mine  and do not necessarily  reflect  those of the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston. 
1. I am inclined  to believe  that M2  is more closely related  to business  conditions  than 
M1, but have decided  to use M1 in most of my analysis because the Federal Reserve 
tends  to emphasize  it and because  the differences  in the recent  behavior  of the two mea- 
sures  are relatively  minor. 
2. All growth rates in this report are continuously compounded annual rates of 
growth. 
3. William  Poole, "Reflections  on U.S. Macroeconomic  Policy," BPEA (1:1974), 
pp. 233-46. 
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Figure 1. Money Stock and Selected Interest Rates, Monthly, 
January  1971-March  1975 
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ing money  growth  and permitting  interest  rates  to rise sharply  in the first 
half of 1974. 
The next  section  is devoted  to a defense  of the proposition  that a 6 per- 
cent M1  growth  was appropriate  in 1974.  There  follows  an analysis  of the 
Federal  Reserve's  explanation  of monetary  policy in the second half of 
1974.  The  report  concludes  with  a few general  comments  on what  the Fed- 
eral  Reserve  should  do, given  recent  experience. 
Judging  the Appropriateness  of Monetary  Policy 
Policymaking  is inherently  a problem  of decisionmaking  under  uncer- 
tainty;  an ex post analysis  of policy  ought,  therefore,  to be cast  in the same 
terms.  Judging  the  performance  of policymakers  requires  that  something  be 
said about preferences  for possible  outcomes,  especially  those related  to 
unemployment  and inflation;  about the effect  of events known  to policy- 
makers  when decisions  are made on the odds of various  outcomes;  and 
about  the impact  on the odds of policy adjustments. 
Although  opinions  differ  on the relative  costs of unemployment  and in- 
flation,  I know of no statements  by public  officials  suggesting  that the cur- 
rent  rapid  reduction  in inflation  has been worth  the cost in terms  of unem- 
ployment.  On the contrary,  public officials  have stressed  repeatedly  that 
inflation  must  be reduced  slowly  in order  to avoid  a depression,  and  that  the 
unavoidable  cost was a modest  rise  in unemployment. 
Differences  over  the role of preferences  arise  largely  because  of varying 
views of how the world  works.  I assign  very  little importance  to inflation 
per se but feel that the economic  and political  dynamics  of inflation  com- 
bine to rule out any significant  chance  of simply  stabilizing  the rate of in- 
flation  at 1973  or 1974  levels.  Further  acceleration  of inflation  very  likely 
would have generated  vastly increased  odds of deeper recession  in the 
future. 
I basically  agree,  then, with Milton Friedman's  argument  that the real 
choice  is not between  inflation  and  unemployment,  but  between  unemploy- 
ment  now and unemployment  later.4  This is an empirical  statement-cor- 
rect or incorrect-about the way the world  works  and not about prefer- 
ences.  Nevertheless,  the tradeoff  between  unemployment  now and unem- 
4. Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," Americani  Econlomic  Review, 
vol. 58 (March 1968),  pp. 1-17 (especially  7-11). 126  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
ployment  later applies  only within  a certain  range.  After a point, more 
unemployment  now clearly  brings  more  unemployment  later, again  for a 
mixture  of economic  and political  reasons.  When  firms  go bankrupt  and 
are dismantled  or fall far behind  in their  capital  spending,  an irreversible 
loss occurs,  and  production  and employment  cannot  be returned  easily  to 
full employment  levels. In addition,  some government  actions taken in 
response  to unemployment,  as well as in response  to inflation,  reduce  eco- 
nomic  efficiency  and interfere  with  the return  to full employment. 
I also  agree  with  the Modigliani-Papademos  argument  that  the desirable 
path for the economy  is one involving  the fastest  possible  recovery  con- 
sistent  with  maintaining  low odds of overshooting  full  employment  and  re- 
accelerating  inflation.5  I differ  with Modigliani  and Papademos  not over 
goals  but  over  the odds  of achieving  any  given  target  path  for  the  economy. 
This  point  will  be discussed  further  in my comments  on current  policy,  but 
it is central  to my analysis  of Federal  Reserve  policy  in 1974. 
THE  EVIDENCE  OF  1974 
Whatever  lessons  evolve from the sharp  rise in unemployment  in late 
1974  and  early  1975,  an analysis  of monetary  policy  in 1974  should  be lim- 
ited to the evidence  available  at the time the policy decisions  were  made. 
The consensus  forecast  in early 1974 was for a flat economy.  Pessimists 
argued  that a couple of quarters  of declining  real gross  national  product 
were  likely  and optimists  thought  a recession  would be avoided.  No one 
foresaw  either  a deep recession  or a boom.6 
By June  the forecasts  became,  if anything,  a bit more optimistic.  The 
disruptive  oil embargo  had been lifted, the unemployment  rate was the 
same  as in January,  and the index of industrial  production  actually  had 
risen  a bit since  April. 
From what  is known  now, the business  cycle peak may be tentatively 
placed  at November  1973.  However,  after  a significant  decline  in the early 
months  of 1974,  the  economy  remained  basically  on a plateau  until  autumn. 
As the year  continued,  the consensus  forecast  was revised  downward,  but 
5. See their paper  in this issue. 
6. It is fair to say that a year ago many economists  were concerned  over the possi- 
bility that maintaining  a 6 percent  trend of money growth would lead to a prolonged 
period  of economic  slack, with unemployment  remaining  above 6 percent,  and perhaps 
rising  slowly,  for several  years.  No one I know, however,  assigned  any significant  proba- 
bility to a 1975  unemployment  rate of the current  magnitude. William  Poole  127 
this plateau  led most forecasters  to believe  that any further  contraction 
would  be relatively  mild.  Indeed,  even as late as fall, many  forecasters  an- 
ticipated  only a moderate  recession.  The "Typical  Quarterly  Forecast  for 
1975"-the median  quarterly  forecast  among  twenty-three  surveyed  by the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond-had a quarterly  pattern  of unemploy- 
ment  for 1975  of 6.8,  7.0,  7.2, and  7.3 percent,  respectively.7  Since  seventeen 
of the  twenty-three  forecasts  are  dated  December  1, 1974,  or  later,  it is clear 
that the magnitude  of impending  unemployment  was completely  unfore- 
seen by the professional  forecasters,  or at least not foreseen  with enough 
confidence  to be included  in the published  forecasts. 
Critics  of monetary  policy  in the first  half of 1974  point  to three  reasons 
why unusually  rapid  money growth  would  have been appropriate:  exog- 
enous  shocks  in the form of the oil embargo,  and short  harvests  in 1973; 
the  sideways  movement  of the  economy;  and  the  rapid  escalation  of interest 
rates. 
Shocks.  Those  who  emphasize  the importance  of the recent  shocks  from 
farm  and  fuel  products  have  not, as far as I know,  referred  to similar  past 
episodes  in support  of their  position  favoring  a more  expansionary  mone- 
tary  policy.  The  Korean  War  experience  presents  some  intriguing  parallels, 
at least on the surface.  Raw material  and farm  prices  surged  sharply  up- 
ward  following  the outbreak  of the war,  transferring  income  to foreign  pro- 
ducers  of primary  products.  However,  most of this income  transfer  was 
probably  saved  in the short  run,  and  the  U.S. balance  on goods  and  services 
(excluding  military)  declined  by $4.3  billion  between  1949  and 1950.  Even 
the  high-employment  federal  budget  surplus  rose  until  late  in 1950.  But  the 
Korean  War  shock  did  not produce  a recession  and  the 1950  acceleration  of 
money growth  has to be viewed, in retrospect,  with regret  rather  than 
pleasure. 
My  point  is not to offer  the  Korean  War  experience  as a counter-example, 
but rather  to argue  that the case for a more expansionary  policy in 1974 
ought  to rest  on more  than simply  feeding  an assumed  surge  in the aggre- 
gate price  level into a standard  macro  model. The underlying  micro be- 
havioral  equations  reflect  the holding of inventories  and precautionary 
balances  by individual  economic  units precisely  in order  to cushion  the 
effects  of unforeseen  disturbances.  The advocates  of a policy  response  to 
the oil shock  ought,  therefore,  to display  some  evidence  that outsize  micro 
7. Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond,  Business  Forecasts,  1975  (February  1975),  p. 5. 128  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
shocks in the past have had the macro effects postulated.  Historically, 
there  has been a tendency  for economic  policy to overreact  to external 
events.  Given  the record,  it seems  best to maintain  neutral  policy settings 
in the absence  of compelling  evidence  that a "clear  and present  danger" 
requires  a policy  response. 
Sideways  economy.  The  basically  sideways  movement  of the economy  in 
the spring  and summer  of 1974  was an obvious  danger  sign. The pattern 
was not dissimilar,  however,  to that characterizing  most of 1962  and late 
1966  through  early 1967-periods that terminated  in renewed  expansion 
rather  than  contraction.  No solid  criteria  have  been  developed  to distinguish 
the economic  "pause  that refreshes"  from one that  forebodes  real  trouble. 
Interest escalation. The  significance  of the sharp  escalation  of short-term 
interest  rates in early 1974  cannot be ignored  even though the rise was 
actually  smaller  than  that in the first  half of 1973.  Rising  rates  in 1973,  as 
in most  other  periods  of business  expansion,  were  appropriate  in retrospect, 
and the key question  is whether  sufficient  information  was  available  to dis- 
tinguish  the 1974  case  from  the others.  The economy  was obviously  some- 
what weak in 1974,  but given  the lags in the effects  of a changed  rate of 
monetary  growth,  this weakness  is relevant  only insofar  as it affects  the 
economic  forecast  for four to six quarters  ahead.  That forecast  held that 
the economy  would  level off, or fall a bit, and then resume  its expansion. 
Interest  rates  rose far more  rapidly  in the first  half of 1974  than would 
have been anticipated  at the beginning  of the year given actual money 
growth.  The proper  response  of monetary  policy to such an unexpected 
change in interest  rates depends  crucially  on whether  the change is the 
result  of a financial  or a real  disturbance.  I have  seen  no evidence  suggesting 
that it stemmed  from  a financial  disturbance. 
In U.S. business  cycle  experience,  steady  or accelerating  money growth 
and  rising  short-term  interest  rates  are  generally  associated  with  expanding 
economic  activity;  similarly,  decelerating  money  growth  and  falling  interest 
rates  are standard  recession  phenomena.  Exceptions  are few. Given  these 
patterns,  the  evidence  would  have  to be very  strong  to prove  that  the  proper 
policy  response  to interest  rate  pressures,  either  up or down,  is a sustained 
acceleration  or deceleration  of money  growth.  Since  the goal of monetary 
policy  in early  1974  was  to permit  a little  slack  to develop  in the  economy  to 
reduce  the risk of a further  acceleration  in inflation,  the Federal  Reserve 
appropriately  maintained  a rate of money growth  roughly  equal to the 
average  of the preceding  several  years. William  Poole  129 
However,  monetary  policy  in the second  half of 1974  was ill-advised  for 
exactly  the  same  reasons.  Declining  money  growth  in the face  of downward 
interest  rate  pressures  should  have  been recognized  as characteristic  of re- 
cession.  Even ignoring  accompanying  interest  rate movements,  the case 
against  permitting  sharp  monetary  deceleration  is overwhelming.  Over  the 
entire  period  since  mid-1907  for which  monthly  data on the money stock 
are  available,  every  recession  was  accompanied  by a significant  deceleration 
of money  growth  and every  significant  deceleration  of money  growth  was 
accompanied  by recession.8 
My position  may be summarized  as follows:  if money growth  is mea- 
sured  over  six-month  spans  and  compared  with  the average  rate  of growth 
over  the  preceding  two or  three  years,  most  accelerations  or decelerations  of 
2 percentage  points  or more  will be found  to have  been  undesirable  under 
almost  any preference  function.  Judgments  vary as to the importance  of 
these  monetary  accelerations  and decelerations  in generating  the business 
cycle. Nonetheless,  if large  monetary  accelerations  and decelerations  are 
typically  regretted  after  the fact, then-even if monetary  instability  is not 
very  important-there  is no point in having  monetary  policy push  in the 
wrong  direction.  The  Federal  Reserve  was  playing  the odds  correctly  in the 
first  half  of 1974  by holding  money  growth  to about  6 percent.  But  by per- 
mitting  the sharp  monetary  deceleration  in the second  half of 1974,  it was 
playing  with adverse  odds of at least 8 to 1 calculated  from 1952-73  ex- 
perience.9  The adverse  odds  were  very  much  higher  if the extensive  prewar 
recession  experience  is also counted.  Moreover,  these findings  were  avail- 
able to the Federal  Reserve  in the second  half of 1974,  and should  have 
guided  policy  decisions. 
There  are  only  two possible  defenses  for  the sharp  monetary  deceleration 
in late 1974.  It might  be argued,  first,  that  persuasive  evidence  was  available 
8. See William Poole, "The Relationship of Monetary Decelerations to Business 
Cycle Peaks: Another Look at the Evidence," Journal of Finance, vol. 30 (forthcoming). 
In this paper  the meaning  of "significant  deceleration"  is defined  carefully. 
9. These  odds  were  calculated  by measuring  money growth  over six-month  periods- 
December-June,  and June-December-and then examining  all cases between  1952 and 
1973  in which  money growth  was more than 2 percentage  points below the average  for 
the preceding  three  years.  The nine periods  of sharply  decelerated  money growth  were 
both halves  of 1953,  both halves  of 1957,  the second half of 1959,  the first half of 1960, 
the second  halves  of 1966,  1969,  and 1971.  Given the actual  performance  of the economy 
in the months  following  these decelerations,  I regard  seven of the nine decelerations  as 
clearly inappropriate,  the 1971 deceleration  as probably inappropriate,  and the 1966 
deceleration  as possibly  appropriate. 130  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
suggesting  that the significance  of the money stock had changed; or, second, 
that the Federal Reserve is unable to control the money stock and therefore 
is not responsible for the sharp monetary deceleration. These two argu- 
ments will now be discussed in turn. 
Federal Reserve Explanations 
The Federal Reserve's position has been expressed clearly in two recent 
statements in response to  proposed congressional legislation concerning 
the conduct of monetary policy.10 
A careful reading of these two statements raises questions about the in- 
ternal consistency of the Board's position. On the one hand, the Board 
seems to accept the argument presented in the previous section: 
We appreciate  the fact that  an expanding  economy  requires  an expanding  sup- 
ply of money,  that any protracted  shrinkage  of the money  supply  may well lead 
to shrinkage  of economic activity, and that attempts  to encourage  growth in 
money  and  credit  will lead  to a decline  of short-term  interest  rates  when  economic 
activity  is weak. 
We are well aware  that an expanding  economy  needs  an expanding  supply  of 
money and credit  and that any protracted  shrinkage  of the money stock could 
lead to or exacerbate  a shrinkage  of economic  activity." 
On the other hand, the Federal Reserve seems to argue that lower Ml 
growth in the second half of 1974 was acceptable because the significance 
10. In regard  to H.R. 212, "Statement  by Arthur  F. Burns,  Chairman,  Board  of Gov- 
ernors  of the Federal  Reserve  System,  before  the Subcommittee  on Domestic Monetary 
Policy of the Committee  on Banking,  Currency  and Housing,  U.S. House of Representa- 
tives, February  6, 1975,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 61 (February  1975), pp. 62-68 
(hereafter  referred  to as "FRB Statement  1"); and in regard  to Senate  Concurrent  Reso- 
lution 18, "Statement  by Arthur  F. Burns,  Chairman,  Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
Reserve System, before the Committee  on Banking,  Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. 
Senate, February  25, 1975,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 61 (March 1975),  pp. 150-55 
(hereafter  referred  to as "FRB Statement  2"). 
11. FRB Statement  1, p. 63, and Statement  2, p. 153.  These two statements,  however, 
are less precise  than they first  appear  since "shrinkage"  of the money stock, interpreted 
literally,  involves  an absolute  decline  and "protracted"  involves  a period of unspecified 
length.  Given  the context  of recent  monetary  analysis  and the frequent  reference  to mone- 
tary growth  rates  in the two statements,  it is reasonable  to interpret  "shrinkage"  in terms 
of a decline in the growth  rate of money. There is no clear interpretation  of the word 
"protracted,"  but the Federal  Reserve  has frequently  argued  that fluctuations  in money 
growth  are unimportant  unless  they last for a year or more. William Poole  131 
of M1 has been changing. This argument, however, is inconsistent with the 
Board's argument that it has attempted to  achieve faster growth in the 
monetary and credit aggregates. Finally, the Federal Reserve has argued 
that it cannot control the money stock very precisely anyway. 
CHANGES IN THE SIGNIFICANCE  OF M1 
The argument that the significance of M1 has changed appears promi- 
nently in both statements: 
As a rule  consumers  and businesses  no longer  hold all, or even most, of their 
spendable  funds as currency  or demand deposits. More and more corporate 
treasurers  have  learned  how to get along with a minimum  of demand  deposits;  a 
large  part  of their  transactions  and  precautionary  balances  are  nowadays  placed  in 
interest-bearing  assets-negotiable certificates  of deposit, Treasury  bills, com- 
mercial  paper,  short-term  municipal  securities,  and other  forms.  Consumers,  too, 
have  learned  to keep  excess  funds  in savings  deposits  at commercial  banks,  shares 
in savings  and loan associations,  certificates  of deposit,  Treasury  bills, and other 
liquid  instruments,  and they shift their  liquid  resources  among  these assets.  The 
result  is that no single concept of money any longer measures  adequately  the 
spendable  funds that are held by the public. 
For example,  the narrowly  defined  money stock rose by 41/2  per cent during 
1974. But this concept of the money supply has lost much of its earlier  sig- 
nificance.12 
The possibility of changing  economic relationships  is a constant source of 
concern to policymakers and advisers, properly reflected in a continuous 
search for evidence of change and a willingness to shade policy targets de- 
pending on the strength of the evidence. 
The evidence for a changing significance for M1 in 1974 is not strong. 
Starting with the April 1975 issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, monthly 
data for five different  monetary aggregates are published. The growth rates 
for these aggregates  in 1973 and 1974 are reported in table 1, and all show 
decelerations of roughly similar magnitude. If a significant shift out of M1 
had taken place in 1974, divergent movements in M1 and, say, M2 would 
have been  expected. Given the uncertainties, an appropriate policy re- 
sponse might have been to aim for some deceleration in M1 and some ac- 
celeration in M2, but in fact the decelerations  in the aggregates,  however de- 
fined, were about the same. 
12. FRB Statement  2, pp. 153-54. 132  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Table 1.  Growth  Rates of Selected U.S. Monetary Aggregates, 1972-74 
Annual  rate in percent,  continuously  compounded 
Growth  rate 
Change 
Monetary  December  1972-  December  1973-  (percentage 
aggregatea  December  1973  December  1974  points) 
M1  6.0  4.6  -1.4 
M2  8.5  7.0  -1.5 
M3  8.5  6.5  -2.0 
M4  11.0  10.1  -0.9 
M5  10.1  8.6  -1.5 
Source: Calculated from dollar figures in the table, "Measures of the Money Stock," Federal Reserve 
Bulletin,  vol. 61 (June 1975). 
a. The measures  are defined as follows: 
MI: Averages of daily figures  of (1) demand deposits of commercial  banks other than domestic interbank 
and U.S. government  deposits, less cash items in process of collection and Federal Reserve float; (2) foreign 
demand balances at Federal Reserve banks; and (3) currency  outside the Treasury,  Federal Reserve Banks, 
and vaults of commercial banks. 
M2: Average  of daily figures  for Ml plus savings deposits, timne  deposits open account, and time certificates 
other than negotiable certificates  of deposit of $100,000 of large weekly reporting banks. 
M3: M2 plus deposits at mutual savings banks, savings and loan shares, and credit union shares  (nonbank 
thrift). 
M4: M2 plus large negotiable certificates of deposit. 
M5: M3 plus large negotiable certificates  of deposit. 
The FRB statement  above mentions  even broader  aggregates  of liquid 
assets-including Treasury  bills, commercial  paper, and so forth-but 
monthly  data  for these  broader  aggregates  are not published.  More com- 
prehensive  data are available  in the flow-of-funds  accounts,  but these are 
not published  on a timely  basis  and are of little  value  in month-by-month 
policymaking. 
The rate of turnover  in demand  deposits  might  also suggest  a changed 
significance  for M1.  The reasons  for changes  in turnover-the ratio of de- 
mand deposit  debits to demand  deposits-are not well understood;  the 
average  annual  rate  of increase  of deposit  turnover  between  December  1964 
and December  1971 was 8.8 percent  while  the rates of increase  in 1972, 
1973,  and 1974  (December  to December)  were  8.0, 19.5,  and 15.0  percent, 
respectively.  If these  numbers  mean  anything,  the Federal  Reserve  should 
have  forced  a sharp  deceleration  of M1  growth  in 1973  and  a mild  accelera- 
tion in 1974. 
Obviously,  new  theories  and  new  data  could  overturn  the  empirical  regu- 
larity  that sharp  decelerations  of money  growth  are associated  with  reces- 
sions,  but they also could  confirm  the empirical  regularity.  In the absence 
of compelling  evidence  to the contrary,  the safest  course  is to assume  that 
M1  has the same  significance  as in the past. William  Poole  133 
IMPOSSIBILITY OF CLOSELY CONTROLLING  Ml 
For some time the Federal Reserve has argued that tight control of the 
monetary aggregates  is technically impossible: 
First,  H.R. 212  assumes  that  the  Federal  Reserve  can  control  the  rate  of growth 
of demand  deposits  plus currency  in public  circulation  over  periods  as short  as 3 
months.  This  we are  unable  to do. All that  we can control  over  such  brief  periods 
is the  growth  of member  bank  reserves;  but  a given  rate  of growth  of reserves  may 
be accompanied  by any of a wide range  of growth  rates  of the narrowly  defined 
money  supply.'3 
Clearly,  the short-run  relationship  between the change in reserves  and the 
change in the money stock has substantial variability. However, the Fed- 
eral Reserve should be able to offset much of this variability. From reports 
submitted  by member banks, the Federal Reserve has a complete enumera- 
tion of daily member bank deposits within eight days of the end of each 
statement week, and partial data are available even sooner. Estimates of 
nonmember bank data and of currency in the hands of the public are re- 
quired to complete the money stock estimates. These estimates are subject 
to errors and uncertainties, but the differences between preliminary and 
final estimates are minor compared  to the shortfall in money growth in the 
second half of 1974. Since reasonably accurate  data on the money stock are 
available on a timely basis, the Federal Reserve has ample opportunity to 
react to undesired  trends in money growth by changing the growth in bank 
reserves. Most of the short-run  variability in the ratio of money growth to 
reserve growth should be in the denominator of the ratio-reserves-rather 
than in the numerator-the  money stock. 
In any case, the slowdown in money growth during 1974 came not from a 
drop in the ratio of money to reserves but rather from a deceleration in re- 
serve growth. Member bank reserves grew at a continuously compounded 
rate of 11.1 percent over the twelve months ending December 1973 but at a 
4.9 percent rate over the twelve months ending December 1974. Moreover, 
reserves grew at a rate of only 0.9 percent in the six-month period ending 
December 1974, in contrast to an 8.8 percent rate in the previous six-month 
period. 
The Federal Reserve has argued that its attempts to expand bank re- 
serves may be ineffective in some circumstances: 
The Federal  Reserve can supply the banking  system with reserves  through 
open market  operations  or through  reserve  requirement  changes;  but if banks 
13. FRB Statement  1, p. 64. 134  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
choose  to repay  debt  or  rebuild  their  liquidity,  these  actions  will  have  little  impact 
on the  public's  money  supply.'4 
This  position  raises  questions  about  two effects  of open  market  operations: 
the first,  on member  bank borrowing  from the Federal  Reserve;  and the 
second,  on member  bank  holdings  of excess  reserves. 
Member  bank  borrowing  at the discount  window  fluctuated  substantially 
in 1974,  rising  from  a December  1973  average  of $1.3 billion  to a peak of 
$3.4  billion  in August  1974,  and  then  dropping  to $0.7  billion  in December. 
The amount  of outstanding  borrowing  is, of course,  on the books of the 
Federal  Reserve,  and  hence  known  continuously.  While  it is true  that  under 
the current  system  of lagged  reserve  requirements-a  system  that fixes in 
advance  the dollar  amount  of required  reserves  in any particular  week- 
increases  in borrowings  cannot  be immediately  offset  by open  market  sales, 
declines  in borrowings  can  nonetheless  be offset  by open  market  purchases. 
The Federal  Reserve  has argued:  "Of  late, open  market  policy  has been 
reinforced  by other  monetary  instruments.  The discount  rate  was reduced 
on three occasions-in  December,  January,  and again early this month 
[February]-from  8 per  cent  to 63/4 per  cent."''5  But  the incentive  for banks 
to use the discount  window has declined  substantially  as open market 
interest  rates  have fallen  to a much greater  extent.  The federal  funds  rate 
averaged  12.01  percent  in August  1974,  4 percentage  points  above  the dis- 
count rate.  Four months  later,  in December,  the funds  rate averaged  8.53 
percent,  or about 3/4  of 1 percentage  point above the discount  rate. By 
March 1975  the federal  funds  rate averaged  5.54 percent,  about 1  '/4 per- 
centage  points  below  the discount  rate  of 63/4 percent.  The sharp  decline  in 
member  bank  borrowings  was  largely  predictable  due  to this sharp  change 
in the spread  between  the discount  rate and open market  rate.'6 
For a given  quantity  of total reserves,  attempts  by member  banks  to re- 
build  liquidity  through  a restructuring  of their  assets  can contract  deposits 
only if the banks  hold excess  reserves.  Member  bank  excess  reserves  were 
$262  million  in December  1973,  and $131  million  and $339  million,  respec- 
tively,  in June  and  December  of 1974.  These  small  swings  in excess  reserves 
14. FRB Statement  2, p. 152. 
15. FRB Statement  2, p. 151. 
16. This discussion  is not meant  to imply  that the discount  rate  should  have  remained 
4 percentage  points below the federal  funds rate.  The discount  rate is best held continu- 
ously  above  the funds  rate;  but having  failed  to maintain  such  a relationship  in mid-1974, 
the Federal  Reserve  should have anticipated  the sharp decline  in borrowing  as market 
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are clearly of  trivial consequence given total  reserves that  exceed  $35 
billion. 
The Federal Reserve has also argued that there is a link between bank 
loan demand and money creation: 
The Federal  Reserve  can have  a marked  influence  on short-term  interest  rates 
and may  also have  some  indirect  influence  on other  terms  of credit.  But it cannot 
force  businesses  or consumers  to borrow  from  their  banks  and  thus  to expand  the 
volume  of bank  loans.  The  Federal  Reserve  cannot  force  people  to hold  money  in 
the form  of demand  deposits  when they prefer  to hold their  transactions  or pre- 
cautionary  balances  in income-earning  assets.'7 
If the Federal Reserve had maintained a higher rate of growth of  total 
member bank reserves, and if member banks had continued their long- 
standing practice of  holding  only  minimal amounts  of  excess reserves 
(which earn no interest), then deposit growth would have been sustained. 
Even if bank loan demand had remained sluggish, banks would have pur- 
chased securities  and thus added to deposits until their liabilities subject to 
reserve  requirements-predominantly demand and time deposits-had  ex- 
panded sufficiently to absorb all of the reserves supplied by the Federal 
Reserve. 
In terms of the composition  of  assets, banks have not become more 
liquid. Of total loans and investments for all commercial banks, loans were 
71.5 percent at the end of June 1974, and 72.5 percent at the end of Decem- 
ber. Federal Reserve policies did not permit banks to increase their hold- 
ings of liquid money-market instruments. That banks have attempted, un- 
successfully,  to improve their liquidity is suggested by the large increase in 
the spread between the prime rate and the commercial paper rate. In June 
and July of  1974 the prime rate was only a little above the commercial 
paper rate; but in December the spread was about 1.5 percentage points, 
and it had increased somewhat further by March 1975. 
If the Federal Reserve had maintained the 1973 rate of growth of bank 
reserves  in 1974, then interest rates on open market securities would have 
declined sufficiently  to induce the nonbank public to hold the larger quan- 
tity of demand and time deposits. While the Federal Reserve cannot di- 
rectly control the mix of demand and time deposits, it certainly can ensure 
that sharply reduced rates of growth do not occur in both M1 and M2. 
Finally, the Federal Reserve has pointed to reductions in reserve  require- 
ments as additional evidence of a more expansionary policy: "Reductions 
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in member bank reserve requirements were also ordered-in  September, 
November, and January,  releasing a total of nearly $2 1/2  billion of reserves 
to  the banking system."18 But these reductions in reserve requirements 
were largely offset by  open  market operations that  drained a  roughly 
equivalent amount of reserves from member banks. Total reserves, mea- 
sured on a basis incorporating seasonal adjustments but without adjust- 
ments for changes in  reserve requirements, fell  from  $36.86 billion  in 
October 1974 to $34.86 billion in March 1975. 
Concluding  Comments 
The explanation for the low rate of money growth in the second half of 
1974 is, I feel, quite simple. It results  partly from the operating procedure of 
the Federal Reserve that pegs the federal funds rate in a narrow band day 
by day, and, given this procedure, partly from an unwillingness to reduce 
the peg on the funds rate rapidly enough to maintain money growth.19 
An enormous scale of open market operations is employed to maintain 
the federal funds rate in the narrow band specified by the Federal Open 
Market Committee. For example, in December  1974, the net change in 
Federal Reserve holdings of U.S.  government securities, federal agency 
obligations, and bankers' acceptances was $393 million. However, during 
the month of December, gross outright purchases of U.S. government secu- 
rities and federal agency obligations were $1.614 billion and gross sales and 
redemptions of these items were $432 million, for a net of $1.182 billion. 
On top of these transactions were $11.470 billion of gross purchases, and 
$11.895 billion of gross sales, of government securities under repurchase 
agreements, for net sales of $425 million. Extensive operations in matched 
sale-purchase transactions ("reverse repurchase agreements")  involved 
18. FRB Statement  2, p. 151. 
19. The Federal  Reserve's  day-by-day  operating  procedure  is basically the same as 
that used in the late 1960s  before  the adoption of targets  for monetary  aggregates.  The 
continued  use of a procedure  clearly  not well designed  for the purpose  of achieving  such 
targets reflects the inertia inherent  in any organization  and the Federal  Reserve's  con- 
tinuing  concern  with day-to-day  stabilization  of interest  rates.  This operating  procedure 
has been described  in "Numerical  Specifications  of Financial  Variables  and  Their  Role in 
Monetary  Policy,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 60 (May 1974),  pp. 333-37; and William 
Poole, "The Making of Monetary Policy: Description and Analysis," New England 
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gross sales of $8.855 billion and gross purchases of $7.962 billion, for net 
sales  of  $893 million. Thus, total  gross purchases for  December  were 
$21.046 billion, and total gross sales and redemptions were $21.182 billion. 
Finally, transactions  reported only on a net basis-repurchase  agreements 
of agency obligations, outright purchases and repurchase agreements of 
bankers' acceptances-netted  $531 million.20 
Open market  activity of this magnitude is unnecessary  to control member 
bank reserves.  Although Federal Reserve statements sometimes imply that 
open market operations are adjusted so that the federal funds rate is ex- 
pected to fall in a certain range, Federal Reserve policy more accurately  in- 
volves whatever open market operations are required to peg the funds rate 
in a narrow day-by-day range. The peg is then adjusted occasionally de- 
pending on the FOMC's view of desired money growth and the importance 
of that objective relative to the interest rate objective: 
Moreover,  the condition  of credit  markets  also weighs  heavily  in decisions  on 
monetary  policy.  There  is a school  of thought  that holds  that  the Federal  Reserve 
need  pay  no attention  to interest  rates,  that  the only thing  that  matters  is how this 
or that monetary  aggregate  is behaving.  We at the Federal  Reserve  cannot  afford 
the luxury  of any such mechanical  rule.21 
While policymakers should consider all available information, the policy 
of pegging the federal funds rate day by day, and changing the peg in re- 
sponse to observed money growth, is no less mechanical than the policy of 
maintaining steady money growth, and much more damaging because it 
leads to procylical behavior of the money stock. To call one policy or an- 
other "mechanical"  begs the issue. Policy must be based on empirical regu- 
larities, and whenever  relationships clearly are changing it is appropriate  to 
adjust policy. The Federal Reserve, however, has offered no evidence that 
economic relationships have been changing in a direction that justifies the 
policies followed in the second half of 1974. 
These operating procedures provide one more reason for unhappiness 
with Federal Reserve policy in the first half of 1974-concern  that it would 
20. The December  1974  figures  discussed  in the text may be found in Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin,  vol. 61 (March  1975), p. All. 
I have not conducted  a systematic  examination  of the typical gross monthly  scale of 
open market  operations  relative  to the net changes. December  1974, however,  does not 
appear  to be atypical.  The largest  net change  for any month in 1974  was August, with a 
net increase  of $3.322  billion. In that month, gross purchases  under  regular  and reverse 
repurchase  agreements  alone amounted  to $13.383  billion. 
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not permit interest  rates to drop rapidly enough, once they were pushed up, 
to maintain money growth at a reasonable rate. Indeed, the Federal Re- 
serve seems to  accept this argument in the other direction as it applies 
currently: 
If, for example,  we presently  encourage  a sharp  decline  of interest  rates  on top 
of the  decline  that  has  already  occurred  in recent  months,  we would  run  the  risk  of 
seeing  short-term  interest  rates  move back  up while  the economy  is still receding. 
There  is, moreover,  a very real possibility  that, as a result of such a policy, a 
monetary  base  would  be established  for a new  wave  of inflation  in the future  and 
that  market  expectations  of such  a development  would  lead rather  promptly  to a 
rise of long-term  interest  rates.22 
The fear is valid under current Federal Reserve operating procedures. 
Under an FOMC procedure that permits only slow and "orderly"  changes 
in the federal funds rate, money growth is likely continually to be off target 
as the adjustments in the funds rate lag behind market pressures. 
But why should the Federal Reserve maintain these procedures?  No pos- 
sible gain warrants  the costs imposed from extensive day-by-day open mar- 
ket operations to limit fluctuations in the federal funds rate. Moreover, this 
policy has obviously failed to stabilize the federal funds rate over spans of 
six to twelve months. Excessive money growth over several quarters at a 
time-as  in 1967-68 and 1972-73-may  temporarily cushion upward pres- 
sures on interest rates, but only at the cost of exacerbating inflationary 
pressures and raising the ultimate interest rate peak. Conversely, abnor- 
mally low  money  growth-as  in  1957 and late  1974-may  temporarily 
cushion declines in interest rates, but only at the cost of deepening reces- 
sions. 
The Federal Reserve should promptly reform its operating procedures. 
The FOMC should direct the Open Market Manager to achieve the rate of 
growth in nonborrowed  reserves  necessary  to attain the target rate of money 
growth, and the federal funds rate should be permitted to fluctuate without 
limit. The goal should be to return promptly to a 6 percent money growth 
path, projected from June 1974, in order to erase the mistake of the second 
half of  1974. As of April 1975, the shortfall below the path amounted to 
$7.3 billion, or 2.5 percent. Once back on that 6 percent path, the money 
stock should be kept there until the economy has recovered sufficiently  to 
warrant a lower trend rate of money growth consistent with long-run price 
stability. 
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Many  economists  share  the Modigliani-Papademos  position  that  a much 
more  expansionary  monetary  policy  is needed.  I would  agree  if I were  con- 
fident  of model  estimates  of the  policies  required  to engineer  their  projected 
employment  path.  But I suspect  that the differences  in the simulated  out- 
comes  under  their  policy  proposal  and my policy  proposal  are, from  past 
experience,  far  smaller  than  the model  errors  themselves.  The safest  course 
is to avoid  major  departures  from policy settings  that, if maintained  five 
years  at a time,  would  be expected  to be in the right  range.  The  recent  fore- 
casting  fiascos  make  it abundantly  clear  that knowledge  is inadequate  to 
make  significant  departures  from  a trend  path  of money  growth  a good  bet. 
By trying  to do too much, policymakers  have put themselves  into a 
vicious "stop-go"  cycle with ever-widening  oscillations.  Each period of 
monetary  expansion  has been higher  than the previous  one-considering 
the 1965,  1967-68,  and  the 1972-73  expansions.  Each  of the inflations  since 
1965  has been worse  than the previous  one. And each setback  in real ac- 
tivity since 1965 has been deeper  than its predecessor-in the sequence 
1967, 1969-70, 1974-75. This pattern must be broken, and the only 
method  in which  I have  any  confidence  is that of stabilizing  money  growth 
and  permitting  the economy  to settle  down  to a stable  policy  environment. 
The discussiont  of this report is combinied  with that of the Modigliani- 
Papademos report which follows. 